The Human Rights Blog

Elizabeth Hebert, M.A. Conflict and Dispute Resolution, University of Oregon

Antionette Vlieger’s book entitled, “Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates: A Socio-legal Study on Conflicts” looks at the conflicts surrounding the controversial relationships between migrant domestic workers and their employees in the Middle Eastern countries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It is published as a part of the Human Rights and Culture Series published by Quid Pro Books.  Her central research question is “Which factors influence the (emergence and character of) conflicts in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates between domestic workers and their employers, the norms of both parties (may) refer to, and the related (im)balance of power?”

Ms. Vlieger outlines the norms in the conflicting societies, discusses the institutions involved with domestic work in the Middle East, household dynamics, and concludes with pragmatic steps forward to bettering the condition of migrant domestic workers in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Ms. Vlieger gives more background on her research in the interview below.

1)     How did you originally begin researching about the situation of migrant domestic workers?

The fact that I got to do this research was quite a coincidence. I was researching intercultural communication between lawyers and their clients, when my professor suddenly passed away. The dean transferred me to another department and my new professor asked me to change  my research topic. He proposed something completely dull and I answered that if I’d have to research that for five years, I’d probably jump off the roof somewhere halfway. We decided to think it over for a couple of weeks and that weekend, at the ballet classes of his daughter, he got a request from an anthropology professor: “Something is going wrong in the Middle East with the domestic workers, can you send a lawyer?”  He had my resume in his bag, showing that I had studied, apart from law school, a bit of anthropology, economics, some Arabic and politics of the Middle East. That next Monday I totally agreed with him that I was perfect for the job. I guess that I was a bit naïve when accepting this assignment. It was a lot more difficult than I had imagined: not intellectually but emotionally.

2)     What was the most difficult challenge you faced when trying to access and interview domestic workers? Employers? Government officials?

There were loads of hurdles to take. For instance, most domestic workers are not allowed to leave the house of their employers. At first I could only interview the women who had run away from their employers, but that very much colored my results. I needed a better place to contact the women and I decided to fly to two countries of origin: The Philippines and Indonesia. There, I simply waited at the airport for planes to arrive from Riyadh and Dubai. I also found an office in Manila where domestic workers renew their passports when going back to the same employer. I interviewed these women in the waiting room. Interviewing employers was not so difficult in Saudi Arabia, but it was in Dubai. The original Emirati population has been reduced to 5%, so many of them are fed up with, or actually afraid, of all foreigners. Most government officials wanted to talk to me and I guess being a tall, blue-eyed blond was a benefit. But the legal-religious elite in Saudi Arabia generally refused to talk to me because I am a woman. Also, I never succeeded in gaining access to prisons or deportation centers. I did manage to research the agencies that send the women across the world. In the two countries of origin,I  sent somebody to find out what they would tell her about the working conditions, and then in Saudi Arabia and Dubai I pretended to be pregnant and in need of a domestic worker to hear what they tell employers about the work conditions. According to some researchers, this is not allowed to conceal that you are a researcher, but when dealing with traffickers, it’s the only way to do it. Otherwise they would never have given answers like: “she will be your slave for two years,” while these are very important data.

3)     How did benevolent employers react to your research?

The employers vary the way people in our own countries vary. There were employers who warned me: “It is very important what you are doing, but please be careful of the government. There is too much money at stake, they don’t want you to ruin their image.” Others agreed that the research was necessary, but thought it was ridiculous that an outsider was doing it. I always replied that as soon as they would actually address the problems themselves, I would be happy to step back. Many simply denied the existence of a problem, or they said the root of the problem was the domestic workers themselves. Some suggested places to research and others simply admitted to being too afraid of the government to say anything about it. One women in Saudi Arabia was very surprised about my research results, about the lies told by the agencies and about the lack of freedom of the domestic workers, partly due to the severe poverty back home. This lady actually went to Indonesia herself, to stay with the family of her domestic worker, to learn more.

4)     Why do you believe there has been an increase in awareness surrounding the issues of migrant domestic workers, particularly in the Middle East?

I am not altogether sure that there has been an increase in awareness compared to the size of the problem. Although I have no quantitative data to support this, I think the problem is growing, not diminishing.  And as it is growing, it draws more attention. Both governments are trying very hard to cover it up. Workers who create problems are instantly deported. Newspapers can’t write about it. I tried to say something about it on the radio, to publish something in the papers, but all in vain. Especially Dubai is doing a lot of window dressing: they built this fantastic center for trafficking victims and show journalists around. But they don’t recognize anybody as  a victim and then publicly claim there is no problem. Dubai thrives on foreign investments, both dirty and clean. They are well aware of the importance of maintaining the brand of Dubai. Saudi Arabia is already struggling with its image, in light of the origins of Al Qaida and the position of women in the country. They play it rough: If, for instance, Indonesia is complaining too much about the treatment of the female workers, the government threatens to stop funding mosques, to stop delivering oil, to stop issuing visas to pilgrims heading for Mecca. Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world, (so) that it a serious threat. Also, there is so much money going around in the human trafficking business that many people are paid to keep their mouth shut. I (too) was threatened: “Are you sure you want to get home alive?” In light of all this, the fact that awareness increases is a miracle and I think it can only be explained by the growing size of the problem.

5)     What do you think of using a trafficking framework when discussing the situation of domestic workers?

I have used several frameworks to discuss this problem: human rights, women’s rights and workers’ rights, access to justice and power balances. But you are right, I paid a lot of attention to the trafficking framework because I noticed a problem there that in my eyes needs to be addressed. The Palermo Protocol on trafficking prescribes national governments to criminalize and prosecute trafficking. But the business of human trafficking has grown tremendously and the amounts of money going around in it are astronomical. In countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines, both poor countries, the average salary of a government employee is very low and therefore most of them can be bribed easily. In the Middle East, the money flows opposite of how it flows in the West, not from citizens to the government in the form of taxes, but from the government to citizens. Oil money is used not only to oppress the population, but also to bribe them. So in the oil-rich Middle East, the system is not corrupt, but corruption is the system. This means that traffickers will not be prosecuted there either: they actually form part of the government. I wanted to draw attention to the fact that we all agree that we cannot leave the fight against drugs to, for instance, the Colombian government, as the drugs mafia is too rich and powerful compared to that government. But at the same time we do leave the fight against human trafficking to national governments, while that mafia is just as rich and powerful. So I feel it is necessary to discuss the issue of domestic workers in a trafficking framework, to draw attention to the fact that the international flows of migrant workers need to be monitored at an international, not at a national level.

Antoinette Vlieger is a professor at the University of Amsterdam. Her book, Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia and the Emirates: A Socio-legal Study on Conflicts is available in paperback, hardcover, Kindle, Nook and Apple. Full info and links available is at Quid Pro Quo and Amazon.

Popularity: 4% [?]

THRB Contributor, Paul Scrom, J.D. Candidate 2012, Hofstra University School of Law

On October 4th, the UN Security Council failed to pass a resolution denouncing the Syrian government’s ferocious oppression of opposition protesters.  Both China and Russia decided to veto the resolution, recalling memories and revealing traces of the Cold War battle between democracy and authoritarianism.  Further, China especially, fears and loathes the interference of the Western world into the internal affairs of other nations.

China and Russia feared the resolution, which condemned “grave and systematic human rights violations,” would allow the West and NATO to use this as an excuse to bomb Syria, as they did with Libya.  The UN passed a similar resolution denouncing Libya.  The resolution proposed tough sanctions on Syria if they failed to end their brutal crackdown on political protesters within 30 days of its passing.  The United States, E.U., and Canada have already imposed unilateral sanctions on Syria and have called for President Bashar al-Assad to give up his authoritarian rule.

This crisis is not the only time where the use of the veto power by one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the United States, China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom), has stymied human rights efforts.

Background: Syrian Dissidence

Syrian dissent began to emerge in March of 2011, following in the footsteps of other Arab Spring uprisings throughout the Middle East.  Beginning with Egypt and Tunisia at the end of last year, the Arab Spring, or the Arab Revolutions, involve civil strikes, demonstrations, rallies, and protests of a multitude of grievances including dictatorship rule, human rights abuses, unemployment, and corruption.  In Syria, the movement began in March when protests erupted in major cities.  In reaction to the protests, President al-Assad sealed off the city of Deraa after five citizens were reportedly killed by state security forces.  The protests continued amid government concessions and reform of the President’s cabinet and high ranking officials, as the President failed to lift an emergency ban on protests and pointed the blame of the deaths on alleged violent participants and foreign influence.  The President further cracked the whip and deployed soldiers to take over cities in which the protests continued. 
Security forces have continually fired upon protesters and the UN reports that over 2900 citizen protesters have been killed since March.  Teachers, civil workers, hospitals and colleges have all been targeted in attempt to squash the protests, including the beheading of a Syrian woman searching a morgue for her activist brother.  The protests have continued to grow despite the reactive human rights abuses by the Syrian government.  The opposition even created the Syrian National Council, a representative body comprising of 115 different dissident groups.

The sanctions implemented against Syria have crippled its economy, specifically its tourist sect, which has become virtually non-existent.  But, the Syrian President holds steadfast and refuses to concede his power.  The UN resolution was an attempt at a potential final blow to the President’s unwavering will, but Russia and China have blocked the proposal.  In fact, Syrian officials have issued threats of suicidal attacks, claimed to be already in place, on the homelands of any Western nation, which tries to physically interfere with the internal affairs the nation.  Similar threats were made to those who choose to recognize the Syrian National Council.  Although Russia claims the veto was used to give the Syrian government a last straw ultimatum, the Russian and Chinese vetoes will have the effect of prolonging human rights abuses in Syria.

The Veto Power and its Use During Human Rights Crises:

Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter gives the Security Council P5 members the power to veto any Council resolution. This power arose out of a concern for protecting the major world powers’ sovereignty and a fear of the world powers abstaining from UN participation.  The power also causes a threat to resolutions before they are even voted on as the draft of a resolution must also be approved by the P5 and other security councils must often politically concede points in hopes of passing a proposed resolution.  Proponents of the veto fear a world without it: the international community would be free to act unpredictably and stomp on the sovereignty of nations.  But this criticism ignores the fact that the other 10 members of the council are elected and serve only two-year terms.  Also, if the veto power was eliminated the resolutions would still only pass with a majority vote.  Historically, the predecessor to the UN, the League of Nations, failed, among other reasons, for the lack of permanence and assurance of participation of the main world powers, specifically the then Soviet Union.  Both the modern and historical reasons for the veto power are obsolete, yet it has had the unfortunate consequence of delaying the prevention of human rights abuses.

Besides the current situation in Syria, the veto power has thwarted attempts at improving human rights in Burma, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Zimbabwe, Kosovo, and Rwanda, among others.  In 2007, China and Russia also vetoed a resolution, which sought to release thousands of political prisoners, stop the use of sex as a tactic of suppression, and slowly implement democratic reforms.  Although the Burmese Military Junta held power since 1962 and perpetuated such abuses since, China and Russia felt the UN had no say in the internal affairs of the country and it did not pose a direct threat to world peace.  It is important to note that the resolution managed a majority of votes from the Council at the time.  Also, the U.S. has continually used its veto powers to prevent investigation into alleged human rights abuses occurring in the contested areas of Palestine and Israel.  For example, in 2001, the U.S. vetoed a resolution, which sought to deploy un-armed, neutral monitors to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which were then occupied by Israel.  Despite reports from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the U.S. refused to abstain or vote in favor of the proposed resolution for a neutral investigation because of biased politics.  China and Russia also vetoed a resolution proposing sanctions on Zimbabwe for their human rights abuses in 2008.  Lastly, the threat of a veto has also been cited as the cause behind the inaction of the Council during the genocides in Sudan, Darfur, and Rwanda.  It has been a common theme that the world often regrets its inaction after the fact, and yet the veto power persists.

Eliminating the Veto:

The veto power has often been criticized and many have proposed alternatives to it, and even supported its destruction.  The veto represents an old, arbitrary, and unfair imbalance of power, which exists only because of the way in which the UN was formed.  The world powers following World War II knew their presence was necessary and was offered permanent placement on the council, along with the veto power, as a result.  Some argue the 1950 UN General Assembly resolution, “Uniting for Peace,” which grants the immediate review of matters in which one of the five members exercised their veto power.  Uniting for Peace has been claimed to fix the veto problem, but it has been used only 10 times, causing most proposed Security Council resolutions to die when vetoed never to be resuscitated.

Unfortunately, the veto power has yet to be eliminated, most likely due to the incredibly difficult procedural obstacle to do so.  The Security Council can only be reformed by a UN Charter Amendment, which requires a 2/3 super-majority vote of all members of the UN, including all P5 members.  The P5 members have the power to veto the elimination of their own veto power, an unlikely scenario.  It seems as though only outside pressure and influence could be the only hope to overcome the difficult hurdle to lessening the significance of the veto power.  The delay in and lack of action against human rights abuses begs for a reevaluation of the Security Council, which is most recently evidenced by the situation in Syria.  This is not a new idea, but one that deserves reconsideration as protesters and civilians in Syria are persecuted by their strong hand government.

Popularity: 6% [?]

David Prater, J.D. Candidate 2012, University of Maryland

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) recently published the indictment against four men accused of conspiring and carrying out an assassination against former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.  International and Lebanese arrest warrants have been issued for Salim Jamil Ayyash; Mustafa Amine Baderrine; Hussein Hassan Oneissi; and Assad Hassan Sabra.

The STL was constituted by the United Nations Security Council at the request of the Lebanese Government after the Cedar Revolution of 2005.  The STL is a unique experiment that gives an international tribunal jurisdiction over domestic crimes related to terrorism.  But, the publication of the indictment indicates the tenuousness of the experiment.

How an internationally constituted tribunal was given jurisdiction over wholly domestic crimes requires an historical and political examination.

Background

Lebanon is in the central Levant and is a multi-confessional society where political power is distributed among the Christian, Muslims, and Druze faiths.  Lebanon was a founding member of the United Nations, but collapsed into civil war in 1975.  During this time Syria and Israel occupied various parts of Lebanon.  It was during the occupation that Hezbollah emerged as a Shia militia to resist Israel’s occupation. Syria recognized the reach of Hezbollah and began sponsoring the organization’s activities to counter Israel.  After the Taif Agreement to end the Lebanese Civili War, Hezbollah was permitted to remain armed and operate as Lebanon’s de facto southern defenses.

Well after the end of the civil war, Syria maintained its presence with the assistance of pro-Syrian officials. Countering Syrian influence were western financed and backed politicians like Rafik Hariri.  In 2004, Hariri, serving as Prime Minister, protested the election of pro-Syrian President Emil Lahoud.  Hariri’s opposition to near plenary Syrian influence and occupation laid the foundation for the emergence of a broad anti-Syrian coalition from Lebanon’s many disparate groups.

On February 14, 2005 over 1,000 kilograms of TNT detonated in van near Hariri’s motorcade.  Hariri and 21 others died from the blast and over 200 by-standers were injured.  This event is thought to have inspired the Cedar Revolution where popular sentiment protests brought an end to Syria’s near 30 year military presence.  However, it is likely that Syrian intelligence operatives continue to operate inside Lebanon.  The full U.N. investigation and report on the Hariri assassination can be read here.

Backed by a still strong anti-Syrian coalition, Lebanon requested the United Nations Security Council to investigate and constitute an international tribunal to try the culprits behind Hariri’s assassination and other political killings that followed.   The Security Council passed resolution 1664 in March 2006 to constitute the tribunal.

In July 2006, Hezbollah, still a close ally of Syria, conducted a cross border raid into Israel capturing and killing five Israel soldiers.  Israel responded with military campaign against Hezbollah and Lebanon that devastated public infrastructure but failed in its objective to dismantle Hezbollah.  The war fractured public opinion over Hezbollah’s role and split the once strong anti-Syrian coalition along largely confessional lines.

Hezbollah emerged from the war politically stronger in Lebanon and became part of the government in 2008.  Meanwhile, the tribunal continued its investigation and the likelihood of Hezbollah’s involvement in Hariri’s assassination became more apparent.  In January 2011, Hezbollah left government causing the coalition that emerged after Hariri’s assassination to collapse.  Hezbollah replaced the coalition with its own in June and backed Najib Mikati as prime minister.

All the while, Hezbollah has criticized the STL as a U.S. and Israeli plot to discredit Hezbollah and exert undue influence in Lebanon.

It is in this context that the STL sealed an indictment against four men with associations to Hezbollah and only weeks later requested the tribunal to amend the restrictions on the indictment.

An Uncertain Future?

The STL was constituted with overwhelming Lebanese and international support.  This changed, however, after the emergence of Hezbollah as a powerful member of the government.

The indictment names four Hezbollah members who conspired in the assassination of Hariri.  The prosecutor’s initial request to seal the indictment was based on an assumption of a cooperative Lebanese security sector that would detain and deliver the accused.  Moreover, the indictment revealed a complex network of cellular activity and other crimes by the accused and pointed toward a larger conspiracy, likely including other members of Hezbollah.

Lebanon failed to arrest the accused and the STL published the indictment with the names of the four accused.  Hezbollah’s reaction was a predictable denunciation of the STL.  Now, the STL has publically committed itself to trials, whether the accused are present or not (trials in absentia are abhorred in common law jurisdictions, other countries, like Lebanon, permit such trials).  The independent defense office at the STL is uncertain about whether the accused will appear or not.

What is unclear at this point is how the indictment will reflect on Hezbollah in Lebanon.  The unsealing of the indictment could have a ‘name-and-shame’ effect, where perpetrators become pariahs in the international community, and domestically as well in this case.  On the other hand, it could play right into Hezbollah’s hand and provide more ammunition for Hezbollah’s calls to no longer fund the STL.  A trial in absentia would similarly be fodder for Hezbollah.

What is clear is that the broad-based coalition that supported the creation of the STL is no longer in power and western-backed interests are marginalized.  But, Syria’s domestic problems with protestors could mean that Hezbollah will have to find legitimacy and independence in a multi-confessional Lebanon.  Such legitimacy could be difficult if Israel maintains it current posture and declines to react over-aggressively to provocative incitements and challenges as it did in 2006.

The indictment could provide the catalyst to reconstitute a broad-based anti-Syrian coalition; or, it could be an embarrassing miscalculation that risks the credibility of the STL.

Popularity: 9% [?]

Elizabeth Hebert, M.A. Conflict and Dispute Resolution, University of Oregon

Issues regarding refugees have plagued the international community throughout the 20^th and 21^st centuries (UNHCR 2000). Refugees present a unique set of problems to their host countries throughout the world, as well as raise both theoretical and practical questions on the issues of forced migration, migrant’s rights, and host countries’ responsibilities and limits thereof (See *Forced Migration Online).  Following the end of WWII, the United Nations worked to address the issue of European refugees.  On December 3, 1949, the UN established the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in order to find solutions for displaced people.  The statutes of the UNHCR were ratified and accepted at the ‘Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951,’ or the ‘1951 Convention’ (**Knudsen, 2009, p. 53).  If a country is party to the 1951 Convention, it is responsible to provide an environment free of discrimination to refugees, access to the labor market, access to the courts, access to healthcare, access to public education, the freedom of movement, and identity papers among other rights guaranteed in the 1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol. Lebanon along with all other Arab countries, except Egypt is not party to the 1951 Convention (Knudsen, 2009).

Palestinian refugees were, however, not included in this convention (Id). Forced to move from their homeland since 1948, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians have relocated throughout the Middle East.  The United Nations Disaster Relief Project (UNDRP) was the first organization created to respond to the crisis of the Palestinians who had been forced to flee, or had chosen to leave their homes. Following the lack of the UNDRP’s success due to poor performance and the threat of war that engulfed them, the UN Relief for Palestinian Refugees (UNRPR) was created, then the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestinians (UNCCP), and finally the UN Relief and Works Agency for Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which is the organization that is still in place today to address the needs of the Palestinians living throughout the Middle East (Knudsen, 2009, p 52-53). UNRWA is operational in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and is only available to the Palestinian refugees who are residents of one of these countries (Knudsen, 2009, p. 54).

While some Palestinians have successfully integrated into their host countries, others have been marginalized and given few opportunities to succeed. Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria are countries with significant populations of Palestinian refugees, due to their proximity to Palestine. Jordan and Syria are considered to have semi-successfully integrated Palestinians into their societies; while in Lebanon, Palestinians have found themselves without basic socio-economic and civil rights. Decree No. 117780/1948 of Lebanese law (13 May 1948) defines Palestinian refugees in Lebanon as “every person who sought refuge in Lebanon as a result of the conflict in Palestine, regardless of nationality, original residence location, and economic situation.”

Lebanon has not granted Palestinians full legal and socio-economic rights, which has created a situation of poverty and deprivation. During the last 60 years since Palestinians have been in Lebanon, the government has granted them various rights and then later taken them away, such as the right to own property. Palestinians at one point had the right to own property, however, now they do not have this right.  Likewise, regional and international governments and organizations have, for the most part, failed to address Palestinian refugees’ needs in Lebanon on all levels.

After analyzing the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon, I have found that they lack the necessary access to the Lebanese labor market. I argue that the status of Palestinians in Lebanon and their lack of access to work opportunities have been formed by a complex web of the political and historical context, the state of the economy, and the lack of consensus among Lebanese politicians. Indeed, I argue that these reasons have led to a policy of deliberately ignoring Palestinians, which I believe could be mitigated by taking small steps on a local level.  More broadly, the situation of Palestinians in Lebanon is multi-layered, and requires action from the international community, the Lebanese government, and the Lebanese and Palestinian communities.

After completing my field research, I also came to the conclusion that there is significant unwillingness to integrate Palestinians into the Lebanese society and grant them basic socio-economic rights. I believe that this is also related to the two types of discrimination—institutionalized and individual.  In my research, I found that discrimination is a major issue that needs to be addressed in considering ways to increase Palestinian access to the labor market.

Institutionalized discrimination or essentially the discriminatory laws, contribute significantly to the difficulties Palestinians face in gaining access to the labor market. As it is now, even with new legislation in place, it is still difficult to get a work permit. Interviewees commented that the August 2010 labor law amendment to Article 59, which grants Palestinians access to the labor market without applying the principle of reciprocity of works permit fees to them was a step in the right direction, but did not eliminate all the issues Palestinians face. With inspiration and motivation from the international community and recent revolutions throughout the Arab world, Palestinians in Lebanon can hold onto their right to access to basic socio-economic and civil rights they have been denied.

Bibliography:

*Forced Migration Online

**Knudsen, A. (2009). Widening the protection gap: The ‘politics of citizenship’ for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, 1948-2008. Journal of Refugee Studies, 22(1), 51-73.

To request access to Elizabeth Hebert’s entire graduate thesis, please contact her through her website, On the Olive Tree.

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Editor’s Note:  For more information, visit Free Middle East.com

Popularity: 2% [?]

As Christians in the West have either already enjoyed Christmas festivities on December 25th, or are gearing up to do so on January 7th, Christmas celebrations for Christians in the Middle East, particularly those in the countries of Iraq and Egypt, have been marred by recent waves of deadly sectarian violence, which has targeted some of the world’s oldest Christian groups.

Many of us can remember the Christmas Eve Massacre in Nag Hammadi, Egypt last year, when six young men were gunned down and killed in the street outside of their church as they left Christmas Eve services on January 6, 2010.  Since then, uprising and violence against Coptic Christians in Egypt has escalated, culminating in a bloody New Year’s Eve massacre in Alexandria following a Coptic Orthodox church service where 21 people were murdered and over 100 more injured.  This recent incident, coupled by threats against Christian groups worldwide, has caused churches around the globe to suspend or abbreviate their upcoming Christmas celebrations.

Still, the Copts are not the only Christian group in The Middle East who have fallen victim to repeat, deadly sectarian violence.  This fall, al-Qaeda declared war against Iraq’s Christian population, which has since been riddled with a near constant stream of threats and violence.  These growing threats have caused Iraq’s Christians to leave the country in droves, fearing for their lives.

Between one million and 1.4 million Christians lived in Iraq in 2003.  Since then, over half of Iraq’s Christians have been driven out of the country.  Today, between 400,000 and 600,000 Iraqi Christians remain.  Likewise in Egypt, Coptic Christians, who comprise ten percent of Egypt’s total population, have fallen victim in increased marginalization, discrimination and incidents of violence.  According to The Assyrian International News Agency, “[t]he number of violations against the Copts for the year 2010 are not yet published, but, from January 2008 to January 2010, there were at least 52 incidents of sectarian violence or tension-about two incidents a month-which took place in 17 of Egypt’s 29 governorates.”

In order to illustrate the breadth and scope of violence against the Coptic and Iraqi Christians over the past several months, I created a timeline of incidents of violence and discrimination against Christians in Iraq and Egypt.  Not only is this timeline meant to compile all of the reported incidences of violence against these groups, but also show how these atrocities are beginning to affect Christians around the world.

Timeline of Violence:

October 31, 2010

Baghdad:  Nearly 60 Iraqi Christians are killed and over 100 are injured by bullets and bomb blasts after Our Lady of Salvation Catholic Church is attacked by armed gunmen strapped with bombs.  Al-Qaeda claims responsibility for the massacre and declares that they are waging war upon Christian minorities.  See Bloomberg Report. President Obama calls the attack “barbaric and heinous” while Pope Benedict XVI calls it a “vile gesture.”  See The New York Times

As a result of the bombing, over 10,000 of Iraq’s Christians flee the city in fear and move to the northern Kurdish provinces or abroad. According to the United Nations, 1,000 Christian families left Iraq.  See The Washington Times

November 10, 2010

Baghdad:  Coordinated bomb attacks on Christian homes, including the homes of those Christians who survived the October massacre, kill three Iraqi Christians and injure 26 others.  A group affiliated with al-Qaeda claims responsibility.  The Christian Science Monitor

November 18, 2010:

Washington, D.C.:  United States Congressman Chris Smith (R-N.J.) introduces a resolution on the floor of the House to denounce the Baghdad Christian Massacre and calls on Washington to assist Baghdad in helping find new homes for those Iraqis wishing to flee the sectarian violence.  See The Hill

November 24, 2010:

Cairo:  Two Coptic Christians are killed and 152 arrested as Christian demonstrators protest the Egyptian government’s refusal to allow a community center to be turned into a church in Cairo’s suburb of Omraniya.  (Egyptian law prohibits Christian churches from being built in Egypt without express governmental permission.)  See The Wall Street Journal

December 22, 2010:

Egypt:  Egyptian universities announce that they will hold final exams during the Coptic Orthodox Christmas period despite requests from Egypt’s Coptic Church to postpone the examinations until after Coptic Christmas celebrations.  See Al-Masry Al-Youm, Egypt

December 23, 2010:

Iraq:  A council of Iraqi Christian churches advises followers to cancel public Christmas celebrations for fear of violence amidst threats by al-Qaeda insurgents. Churches in the cities of Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul, and Basra, take down Christmas decorations, cancel Christmas Eve Mass, and advise Christian laity to refrain from decorating their homes.  In Kirkuk, an appearance by Santa Clause is cancelled. See The Boston Globe

December 30, 2010

Alexandria:  After a New Year’s Eve service, a bomb explodes in front of Al-Qiddissin “Saints” Coptic Orthodox Church killing 21 worshipers and injuring over 100 others.  According to The Los Angeles Times, “the bomb designed to inflict maximum civilian casualties, bore the hallmark of Al Qaeda militants.”  See Newsweek

Baghdad:  Two Christians are killed and 16 wounded after coordinated bombs are detonated at six separate Christian targets within a one-hour period throughout Baghdad in front of Christian homes.  Among those dead are Fawzi Ibrahim, 80, and his 75-year-old wife, Jeanette, who opened the front door of their home only to find a piece of luggage with a bomb hidden inside. See Los Angeles Times

January 3, 2011

Baghdad:  Christian woman Rafa Toma is shot dead in her bed while asleep in her home.  See AOL News

Europe:  Radical Islamist website affiliated with al-Qaeda posts a “hit list,” which details Coptic Orthodox Christian Churches throughout Europe, including in France, England, The Netherlands, and Germany, that are to be bombed during Julian Christmas Eve services.  Coptic services throughout Europe will be shortened due to security threats.  See CNN

January 4, 2011

Sydney, Australia:  Coptic Orthodox Christian Christmas services due to take place on January 7 are cancelled after threats against Coptic Churches in Australia.  According to Bishop Suriel, Melbourne Bishop of the Coptic Orthodox Church, “[t]he whole Coptic community all around the world is just in total shock and dismay and never ever expected anything like this to happen in Egypt….The images that are coming out of Alexandria are just unbearable to see… It’s overwhelming for us right now.”  ABC News 24 Australia

Montreal, Canada:  Coptic Orthodox clergy plan to hold Christmas Eve and Christmas Day services under tightened security but cancel all other Christmas-related events.  See The Montreal Gazette

Is the violence against Christians in Iraq and Egypt tantamount to genocide?

Earlier this week, former Lebanese President Amin Gemayel boldly labeled the violence against Iraqi and Coptic Christians as genocide stating that,“[m]assacres are taking place for no reason and without any justification against Christians. It is only because they are Christians.”  While I would not go so far at this point to use the word “genocide” to describe the targeted violence against Christians in Iraq and Egypt, former President Gemayel’s assertion is certainly reasonable given the context and definitely worth at least a short analysis.

Genocide is a very specific and complex term, referring to “an extreme and inhumane form of persecution.”  (See Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al.) The United Nations defines genocide as, “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life, calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”  (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2)  However, the legal significance of the term goes even deeper than the UN’s definition, as to be found guilty of genocide, the persecutor’s general and specific intent must be carefully scrutinized. For example, the term, “intent to destroy” means that the perpetrator of genocide must recognize that his actions target a protected group and also, that his intent must be to destroy more than he alone is physically able to do, thus placing the killing into a genocidal context. (See ‘What does ‘intent to destroy’ in genocide mean?‘ Kai Ambos, International Review of the Red Cross, Volume 91 Number 876 December 2009)

Due to the complexity of the term coupled with our inability, at present, to fully know or understand the mindset of the perpetrators involved, it appears premature to determine whether or not these obviously sectarian acts of violence against Iraqi and Coptic Christians are tantamount to genocide.   That said, one thing does appear certain to me:  If this targeted violence against Christians in The Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Egypt, continues to escalate and if the numbers of Christians living in these regions continues to decrease as a result, it would point strongly to the beginnings of a possible, future genocidal campaign.

That said, The Human Rights Blog strongly and vociferously condemns the growing, recent attacks against Coptic and Iraqi Christians and sends deep condolences to those who lost loved ones as a result of the violence.

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